

9 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bross

SUBJECT: Joint Study of DOD Representation Abroad

The potential impact of this joint study was considered in the CIP review and the recommended Format A for signature of the Secretary of Defense carried the proviso that the Attache system would be reexamined subsequent to a decision on the recommendations contained in the joint study and that resources requirements would be adjusted if appropriate.

I understand that DIA, prior to and separate from this joint study, has developed a plan for revision of the attache system which includes such matters as a State Department take-over of the administrative work. However, I do not believe that the plan has yet been put in as a program change proposal.

To the extent that the attaches are a part of the overall U. S. foreign intelligence effort, I do not see how the Director can divorce himself completely from such basic problems as their strength and activities. For one thing, the entire cost of the attache system which runs [] a year (excluding investment money for new aircraft which was deferred by the Secretary of Defense) is charged to "intelligence", even though the joint study indicates that in Europe for example, only about [] of attache manpower and time is devoted to intelligence activities. I would agree that the Director has no responsibility for that portion of the attache effort which is concerned with non-intelligence activities, but he should be mindful of the fact that "intelligence" is being charged with the whole bill.

With respect to Europe, I think it should be recognized that the position of the attaches as intelligence collectors is complicated by the presence of very large U. S. military commands in the same area and their close relationships with our allies - both conditions tend to put the attaches in an untenable position as they are both outnumbered and outranked in all directions. However, it should be noted that the responsibility for the coordination of all overt

collection overseas for the purpose of minimizing undesirable duplication, etc., is given to the Senior U. S. Representative under NSCID No. 2 and DCIC 2/1; the departments and agencies at home are responsible for keeping him informed of the scope and nature of their intelligence activities. There is no lack of authority and responsibility under existing directives to correct the 'evils', which the joint study has surfaced.

With respect to requirements, the joint study implies that some of the data called for is "useless", most of it is low priority, and there is serious doubt that much of it is "essential." To determine the validity of this charge I think we have to look at the current basis of the overall requirements system, not at the attached system's part of it alone. The fact is that our present directives call for the collection of encyclopedic information on practically every country in the world. DCID 1/2 establishes "comprehensive national intelligence objectives, generally applicable to all foreign countries and areas", and the listing of the priority objectives under DCID 1/3, presupposes that the bulk of the intelligence required for the formulation and execution of national security policy will be the product of normal intelligence collection and research pursuant to DCID 1/2.

I would point out that this philosophy was, in effect, revalidated by the USIB when they issued the latest quarterly supplement to the PNIOs on 7 October 1964; this tends to reinforce, I think, my view that consideration of the requirements problem must be addressed to the system as a whole and not to its impact on any single collection method.

25X1 The joint study presents one view on requirements for the US which I think is worthy of very careful consideration and application to all countries; they say: 'Collection needs relative to volume, subject and frequency must be tailored not to global and general needs but to (1) [redacted] (2) availability of data through official and published sources, and (3) the capabilities of personnel. As you know, I believe that the country by country approach is the best one through which to achieve a common denominator that is applicable to all intelligence activities because it is the fact that the U. S. has relations with foreign countries that brings about the need for foreign intelligence in the first place; the nature of those relations at any given point in time should be the basis for determining the kind of intelligence needed, its priority, etc.'

The report states that there are [] U. S. military intelligence personnel in the intelligence business in Western Europe just on the face of it I question the validity of this figure. []

[] suggest that you query Mr. Lewis at the Bureau of the Budget as to how they arrived at such a figure.

The joint study on Latin America comes up with generally the same conclusions as they did on Europe. They too stress the country by country approach, i. e.: "The total (Intelligence) effort in Latin America would benefit from more selectivity in levying requirements and more precision in adjusting them to specific country situations." The study also suggests there should be more analysis of the information collected by the attaches in the field

Now for some comments on the specific points raised in your memorandum:

a. As for a review of requirements, it is my understanding that the [] review of COMINT requirements is but the first step in a review that will eventually consider all requirements served upon all types of collection resources.

b. DIA now has a system that calls for collection plans from practically all DOD collection organizations except those that are purely tactical and the U & S Commands who do not have any collection resources under their direct command. Personally, I would like to see community-wide country collection and production plans, with the countries viewed from a target perspective and with the requirements for information and intelligence related to the relationship between the target country and the U. S. With respect to the number and status of attaches, I believe that we would have to concern ourselves with at least that portion of the attache effort which a plan might allocate to the collection of intelligence information and also with any status factors which would have an effect upon the attaches capabilities to collect.

c. Until we know how they arrived at the figure of [] military intelligence personnel in Europe, it is virtually impossible to make a comment. With reference to Italy and the number of intelligence units listed [] at least [] of them are involved in counter-intelligence and security activities which are unrelated to the kind of "requirements" discussed elsewhere in the report; G-2 - SETAF, the DI of the Fleet Air Command, and the 6th Fleet Recon aircraft are

tactical units whose size and activities are not based primarily on national level intelligence requirements. The same situation is true in Germany where we also have units engaged in CI and security work and in providing tactical support (7th Army). The intelligence elements under USAFE and USAREUR do work to satisfy both the unified command (EUCOM) and DOD at the national level, but their primary task is to provide intelligence support to the ground and air forces in Europe. This can become a numbers game and the figure made higher or lower depending on how far down the command line you want to slice it out.

d. The suggestion that attaches in the field provide more local analysis and evaluation is rather good, the product would be valuable at the Washington end if it came from an experienced officer and for all of them it would be good experience.

e. Finally, is there anything in these reports that would affect the CS. The only "dangerous" area I can see is in the field of communications and I gather from the joint study report that these matters are already under study at the highest levels and that appropriate action is being taken to protect CS interests.

I do not believe there is anything the DCI has to do about these reports at this time. We should continue to get them as they come out and to make sure that something does not crop up that would require action by the DCI. Some respects the study is a bit of a tempest in a teapot as the attache system overall represents about [] of the money and [] of the manpower in the CIP. Furthermore, if the study's estimate of the amount of attache effort devoted to intelligence is correct [] in Europe for example) it would appear that the major problems lie outside the area of the DCI's responsibility.

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A/D/DCI/NIPE